[(Cryptographic) hash functions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function) map binary data of arbitrary length to a fixed size "hash" (hashes are also sometimes called "digests").
Hash functions are used in cryptography to produce shorthand "placeholders" for data. Two properties of cryptographic hash functions are particularly important:
- ["Pre-image resistance"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preimage_attack): Given a hash value, it should be hard to find a message that maps to that hash value.
- ["Collision resistance"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collision_resistance): It should be hard to find two messages that map to the same hash value.
[Symmetric-key cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symmetric-key_algorithm) uses the same cryptographic key for both encryption and decryption. Symmetric-key cryptographic systems support *encryption/decryption* operations.
Participants in symmetric-key operations need to exchange the shared secret over a secure channel.
Symmetric-key cryptography has major benefits: it is much faster than public-key cryptography (see below). Also, most current symmetric cryptographic algorithms are considered quantum-resistant[^postquantum].
[^postquantum]: Daniel J. Bernstein (2009). ["Introduction to post-quantum cryptography" (PDF)](http://www.pqcrypto.org/www.springer.com/cda/content/document/cda_downloaddocument/9783540887010-c1.pdf) states that: "many important classes of cryptographic systems", including secret-key cryptographic mechanisms like AES "[..] are believed to resist classical computers and quantum computers." (pages 1, 2).
However, exchanging the required shared secret is a problem that needs to be solved separately.
[Hybrid cryptosystems](hybrid_cryptosystems) (see below) are one common approach to leverage the benefits of symmetric-key cryptography, while handling the shared secret with a separate mechanism (using public-key cryptography).
Symmetric-key cryptography is used in OpenPGP in three contexts:
- most prominently, as part of a hybrid cryptosystem to encrypt and decrypt data,
- to encrypt [password-protected private key material](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-10.html#name-secret-key-encryption), and
- for [password-protected data encryption](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-10.html#name-symmetric-key-encrypted-ses) (a less commonly used feature of the standard).
[^sessionkey]: In OpenPGP version 6, when using the ["Version 2 Symmetrically Encrypted Integrity Protected Data Packet Format"](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-10.html#name-version-2-symmetrically-enc), a "message key" is derived from a "session key". Previously (up to OpenPGP version 4, and in version 6 when using ["Version 1 Symmetrically Encrypted Integrity Protected Data Packet Format"](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-10.html#name-version-1-symmetrically-enc)), the "session key" was used directly as a symmetric encryption key.
[Authenticated encryption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_encryption) is a class of cryptographic schemes that gives additional guarantees besides confidentiality.
In OpenPGP version 6, AEAD was introduced as a successor to the MDC[^MDC] mechanism. AEAD is a common mechanism to solve the problem of "malleability": In past versions of the OpenPGP protocol, some malicious changes to ciphertext were undetectable. AEAD protects against undetected changes of ciphertext.
[^MDC]: In OpenPGP version 4, a mechanism called MDC (Modification Detection Code) was introduced to serve a comparable purpose as AEAD. While MDC is a non-standard mechanism, as of this writing, there are no known attacks against the scheme.
Protecting against malleability counters a variation of the EFAIL[^efail] attack.
[^efail]: A variation of the [EFAIL](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EFAIL) attack can be prevented by both the MDC and AEAD mechanisms. Also see ["No, PGP is not broken, not even with the Efail vulnerabilities"](https://proton.me/blog/pgp-vulnerability-efail), especially the section "Malleability Gadget Exfiltration Channel Attack".
[Public-key cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) systems use asymmetric pairs of related keys. Public-key cryptographic systems support *encryption/decryption* as well as *digital signature* operations.
Unlike symmetric cryptography, public-key cryptography doesn't require participants to pre-arrange a shared secret. Instead, with public-key cryptography, the public parts of the key material can be shared openly and then used for cryptographic operations.
An asymmetric cryptographic key pair consists of a public and a private part. In this document, we'll show the public part of a key pair in green, and the private part in red.
Note that, for historical reasons, the OpenPGP RFC and other documentation often use the non-standard term "secret key" instead of the more common "private key."
So in OpenPGP, the pair of terms "public/secret key" is sometimes used instead of the more common "public/private key."
[Digital signatures](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) are a mechanism that is based on asymmetric cryptography. With this mechanism, one actor can make a signature over a digital message, and another actor can check the validity of that signature.