diff --git a/book/source/08-signing_components.md b/book/source/08-signing_components.md
index da0d4e4..4a76589 100644
--- a/book/source/08-signing_components.md
+++ b/book/source/08-signing_components.md
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ Self-signatures play a crucial role in forming and managing the structure of Ope
 
 Internally, an OpenPGP certificate is essentially a series of packets strung sequentially. When a certificate is stored in a file format known as a [transferable public key](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-10.html#name-transferable-public-keys), packets can be easily added or removed.
 
-To safeguard against unauthorized additions and alterations of components, OpenPGP uses cryptographic signatures. These validate that any additions, such as added subkeys or [identity components](identity_components), were made by the owner of the OpenPGP certificate using its primary key. While anyone can still store unrelated elements to a certificate dataset, OpenPGP implementations will reject them if they lack a valid cryptographic connection with the certificate.
+To safeguard against unauthorized addition or alteration of components, OpenPGP uses cryptographic signatures. These validate that all components, such as subkeys or [identity components](identity_components), were linked to the OpenPGP certificate by its owner, using the primary key. While anyone can still store unrelated elements to a certificate dataset, OpenPGP implementations will reject them if they lack a valid cryptographic connection with the certificate.
 
 ```{note}
 Conversely, omissions of packets by third parties can easily occur when handling an OpenPGP certificate dataset. This could pose a challenge, for example, when an attacker deliberately omits revocation packets. Without access to an alternative, complete certificate source, recipients might not detect these omissions.