mirror of
https://codeberg.org/openpgp/notes.git
synced 2024-12-22 05:47:58 +01:00
Merge branch 'paul-glossary' into paul-inline-signed-test
# Conflicts: # book/source/glossary.md
This commit is contained in:
Heiko Schaefer
commit
48e83cc0ad
4 changed files with 66 additions and 40 deletions
|
|
@ -67,15 +67,17 @@ In addition to key management, a keystore often involves various supplementary f
|
|||
|
||||
OpenPGP is subject to specific vulnerabilities known as key overwriting (KO) attacks. These attacks exploit weaknesses in how encrypted private keys or their metadata are handled, potentially leading to the leakage of secret data when the key is used. The core issue lies in OpenPGP's handling of Secret-Key packets, where corruption of the non-encrypted fields can cause the unaltered private key material to be used with altered parameters. This mismatch can result in private key leakage.
|
||||
|
||||
Importantly, KO attacks are particularly relevant when an attacker is responsible for storing a user's encrypted private key. By altering the algorithm field in the Secret-Key packet, the attacker may cause the user to perform a cryptographic operation with a different algorithm. E.g., performing a DSA operation with ECC private key material. By observing the output of that attacker-corrupted operation, the attacker can recover the user's unencrypted private key material, even though the attacker had no direct access to it.
|
||||
Importantly, KO attacks are particularly relevant in scenarios where an attacker has control over the storage of a user's encrypted private key. By manipulating the algorithm field in the Secret-Key packet, the attacker may lead the user to perform a cryptographic operation with a different algorithm. For example, the user might unknowingly perform a DSA operation with ECC private key material. Although the attacker does not have direct access to the encrypted private key material, the attacker can deduce and recover the user's unencrypted private key material by observing the output of this compromised operation.
|
||||
|
||||
### Mitigation
|
||||
|
||||
Understanding KO attacks is crucial due to their potential to compromise the integrity and confidentiality of encrypted communications, and the risk of complete private key material compromise. KO attacks highlight the necessity for robust key validation procedures and the dangers of storing keys in insecure environments. OpenPGP application developers should consider if this attack class is a concern in their applications.
|
||||
Understanding KO attacks is crucial due to their potential to compromise the integrity and confidentiality of encrypted communications, and the risk of complete private key material compromise. KO attacks highlight the necessity for robust key validation procedures and the dangers of storing keys in insecure environments. OpenPGP application developers should conduct a risk assessment to determine the relevance of KO attacks to their applications.
|
||||
|
||||
Private keys that are protected with [S2K usage mode 253 (AEAD)](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-secret-key-encryption), are not vulnerable to KO attacks. This mode ensures the integrity of the private key by using its unencrypted fields (including the algorithm field) as the *authentication tag* for integrity verification in the decryption process. When an attacker alters the unencrypted part of the packet, then decryption of the private key material will fail, and the user is prevented from e.g. accidentally using the key material with an altered attacker-controlled algorithm.
|
||||
Private keys secured with [S2K usage mode 253 (AEAD)](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-secret-key-encryption) are safeguarded against KO attacks. This mode ensures the integrity of the private key by using its unencrypted fields, including the algorithm field, as the *authentication tag* for integrity verification in the decryption process.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that while S2K usage mode 253 (AEAD) has been introduced in the OpenPGP version 6 specification, it can also be applied to OpenPGP version 4 key material (also see {ref}`migration-s2k`).
|
||||
When an attacker alters the unencrypted part of the Secret-Key packet, then decryption of the private key material will fail. This effectively prevents the user from unknowingly using the key material with an altered attacker-controlled algorithm.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that while S2K usage mode 253 (AEAD) has been introduced in the OpenPGP version 6 specification, it can also be applied to OpenPGP version 4 key material (see {ref}`migration-s2k`).
|
||||
|
||||
#### Resources
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ To form an {term}`OpenPGP certificate`, individual {term}`components<Component>`
|
|||
In very abstract terms, the {term}`primary key<OpenPGP Primary Key>` of a {term}`certificate<OpenPGP Certificate>` acts as a root of trust or "{term}`certification authority<Certification Authority>`." It is responsible for:
|
||||
|
||||
- issuing {term}`signatures<OpenPGP Signature Packet>` that express the {term}`certificate holder`'s intent to use specific {term}`subkeys<OpenPGP Subkey>` or {term}`identity components<Identity Component>`;
|
||||
- conducting other lifecycle operations, including setting {term}`expiration` dates and marking {term}`components<Component>` as {term}`invalidated<Validation>` or "`revoked<Revocation>`."
|
||||
- conducting other lifecycle operations, including setting {term}`expiration` dates and marking {term}`components<Component>` as {term}`invalidated<Validation>` or "{term}`revoked<Revocation>`."
|
||||
|
||||
By binding {term}`components<Component>` using digital {term}`signatures<OpenPGP Signature Packet>`, recipients of an {term}`OpenPGP certificate` need only {term}`validate<Validation>` the {term}`authenticity<Authentication>` of the {term}`primary key` to use for their communication partner. Traditionally, this is done by manually verifying the *{term}`fingerprint<OpenPGP Fingerprint>`* of the {term}`primary key<OpenPGP Primary Key>`. Once the {term}`validity<Validation>` of the {term}`primary key<OpenPGP Primary Key>` is confirmed, the {term}`validity<Validation>` of the remaining {term}`components<Component>` can be automatically assessed by the user's OpenPGP software. Generally, {term}`components<Component>` are {term}`valid<Validation>` parts of a {term}`certificate<OpenPGP Certificate>` if there is a statement signed by the {term}`certificate<OpenPGP Certificate>`'s {term}`primary key<OpenPGP Primary Key>` endorsing this {term}`validity<Validation>`.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -20,10 +20,10 @@ Algorithm Preferences
|
|||
See [](recipe-algorithm-preferences).
|
||||
|
||||
Asymmetric Cryptography
|
||||
Asymmetric cryptography is used in OpenPGP. For a more detailed discussion see [](public-key-cryptography).
|
||||
Asymmetric cryptography (also known as public-key cryptography) is used in OpenPGP to send messages without using a prior shared secret. For a more detailed discussion see [](public-key-cryptography).
|
||||
|
||||
Authenticated Encryption With Associated Data
|
||||
Short AEAD, refers to an encryption scheme that ensures confidentiality of a message. Additionally, additional data, which is not confidential, may be associated with the message.
|
||||
Short AEAD, refers to an encryption scheme that ensures confidentiality of a message. Additionally, additional data, which is not confidential, may be associated with the message, ensuring integrity of both the confidential part of the message, as well as the additional data.
|
||||
|
||||
See Wikipedia on [Authenticated Encryption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_encryption).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ Authentication
|
|||
The term "authentication" here is semantically different from the one used in {term}`Authentication Key Flag`.
|
||||
|
||||
Authentication Key Flag
|
||||
A {term}`Key Flag`, which indicates that a {term}`Component Key` can be used to confirm control over {term}`private key material` against a remote system. The term "authentication" here is semantically different from {term}`Authentication`. See [](key-flags).
|
||||
A {term}`Key Flag` which indicates that a {term}`Component Key` can be used to prove control over {term}`private key material` with a challenge-response mechanism. This is typically done to log into a remote system, often using the OpenSSH protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that the term "authentication" is used in a different context here than {term}`Authentication` of {term}`identity claims<identity claim>` that are associated with a {term}`certificate`. See [](key-flags).
|
||||
|
||||
Authentication Tag
|
||||
See {term}`Message Authentication Code`.
|
||||
|
|
@ -49,12 +51,12 @@ Binary Signature
|
|||
Binding
|
||||
The process of creating a {term}`Binding Signature` for a {term}`Component`, or the resulting {term}`Binding Signature`.
|
||||
|
||||
See {ref}`binding-signatures` for more.
|
||||
See [](binding-signatures) for more.
|
||||
|
||||
Binding Signature
|
||||
A {term}`self-signature` on a {term}`component` which associates that {term}`component` to the issuing {term}`component key` in a {term}`certificate<OpenPGP Certificate>`.
|
||||
|
||||
See {ref}`binding-signatures` for more.
|
||||
See [](binding-signatures) for more.
|
||||
|
||||
CA
|
||||
See {term}`Certification Authority`.
|
||||
|
|
@ -69,7 +71,7 @@ Certificate Authority
|
|||
See {term}`Certification Authority`
|
||||
|
||||
Certificate Holder
|
||||
A person or other entity, that holds an {term}`Transferable Secret Key` and thus is able to modify the accompanying {term}`OpenPGP Certificate`.
|
||||
A person or other entity, that holds an {term}`Transferable Secret Key` and thus is able to modify the accompanying {term}`OpenPGP Certificate`. Typically this is the owner of {term}`OpenPGP key`.
|
||||
|
||||
Certification
|
||||
A certification, in OpenPGP, is a signature that makes a statement about an {term}`identity` in a {term}`certificate<OpenPGP Certificate>`, or an entire {term}`certificate<OpenPGP Certificate>`.
|
||||
|
|
@ -90,7 +92,7 @@ Certification Revocation Signature Packet
|
|||
Certification Signature
|
||||
See {term}`Certification`.
|
||||
|
||||
Certifying Self-signature
|
||||
Certifying Self-Signature
|
||||
An {term}`OpenPGP Signature Packet` by the {term}`Certificate Holder` on an {term}`Identity Component` of their own {term}`Certificate`.
|
||||
|
||||
Certifying Signature
|
||||
|
|
@ -113,25 +115,25 @@ Component Key
|
|||
See {term}`OpenPGP Component Key`.
|
||||
|
||||
Compressed Data Packet
|
||||
A {term}`packet` that contains compressed data. It represents a "compressed message". The uncompressed data in turn consists of an {term}`OpenPGP message`, made up of a series of {term}`packets<packet>`.
|
||||
A {term}`packet` that contains a compressed {term}`OpenPGP Message` (typically a {term}`Literal Data Packet`). A Compressed Data Packet represents a "compressed message".
|
||||
|
||||
Compression
|
||||
See {term}`Data Compression`.
|
||||
|
||||
Creation Time
|
||||
The point in time at which e.g. an {term}`OpenPGP Certificate`, or one of its {term}`component<Component>` is created.
|
||||
The point in time at which e.g. an {term}`OpenPGP Signature`, an {term}`OpenPGP Certificate`, or one of its {term}`component<Component>` is created.
|
||||
|
||||
Creator
|
||||
See {term}`Issuer`.
|
||||
|
||||
Criticality Flag
|
||||
A flag on {term}`Subpacket`s, that defines their criticality, which is used for validation. See [](criticality-of-subpackets).
|
||||
A flag on {term}`Subpacket`s, that can mark them as critical or non-critical, which is has an influence on signature validation. See [](criticality-of-subpackets).
|
||||
|
||||
Cryptographic Key
|
||||
A {term}`symmetric<Symmetric Cryptography>` or {term}`asymmetric<Asymmetric Cryptography>` cryptographic key is used for signing and encryption operations. See [](cryptography).
|
||||
A {term}`symmetric<Symmetric Cryptography>` or {term}`asymmetric<Asymmetric Cryptography>` cryptographic key. See [](cryptography).
|
||||
|
||||
Cryptographic Signature
|
||||
A raw cryptographic signature is a sequence of bytes created by a {term}`Cryptographic Key`.
|
||||
A raw cryptographic signature is an algorithm-specific sequence of bytes created by a {term}`Cryptographic Key`.
|
||||
|
||||
CTB
|
||||
See {term}`Cipher Type Byte`.
|
||||
|
|
@ -154,19 +156,28 @@ Delegation
|
|||
This kind of delegation involves {term}`certifications<Certification>` that include the {term}`trust signature` subpacket.
|
||||
|
||||
Detached Signature
|
||||
A {term}`Data Signature` which exists as a separate file to the file it was created for. See [](forms-of-data-signatures).
|
||||
A {term}`Data Signature` which exists separately to the data it was created for. See [](forms-of-data-signatures).
|
||||
|
||||
Direct Key Signature
|
||||
A {term}`Signature` that sets preferences and advertises {term}`features<Features Subpacket>` applicable to an entire {term}`Certificate`. See [](direct-key-signature).
|
||||
Describes both a {term}`Signature Type ID`, as well as an according {term}`OpenPGP Signature` over a {term}`Primary Key`.
|
||||
|
||||
Issued as a {term}`Self-Signature` it sets preferences and advertises {term}`features<Features Subpacket>` applicable to an entire {term}`Certificate`. See [](direct-key-signature).
|
||||
|
||||
Embedded Signature Subpacket
|
||||
An {term}`OpenPGP Signature Subpacket` which contains a complete {term}`OpenPGP Signature Packet`.
|
||||
|
||||
See [RFC 5.2.3.34](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-embedded-signature)
|
||||
|
||||
Encrypted Data
|
||||
Data that is encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
See [](/encryption).
|
||||
|
||||
Encryption Key Flag
|
||||
A {term}`Key Flag`, indicating that a {term}`Component Key` can be used for encrypting data. See [](key-flags).
|
||||
|
||||
There are two distinct encryption key flags, indicating that the key can encrypt communications, or data in long-term storage respectively.
|
||||
|
||||
Expiration
|
||||
A mechanism by which a {term}`Component` is invalidated due to the {term}`Expiration Time` of its {term}`binding signature` being older than the {term}`Reference Time` by which it is validated.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -174,7 +185,7 @@ Expiration Time
|
|||
The time of expiry of an {term}`OpenPGP Signature Packet`.
|
||||
|
||||
Features Subpacket
|
||||
A {term}`OpenPGP Signature Subpacket`, which denotes advanced OpenPGP features an {term}`implementation<OpenPGP Implementation>` supports.
|
||||
An {term}`OpenPGP Signature Subpacket`, which denotes advanced OpenPGP features an {term}`implementation<OpenPGP Implementation>` supports.
|
||||
|
||||
For an in-depth view on these {term}`subpackets<OpenPGP Signature Subpacket>` see [](zoom-dks).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -199,6 +210,9 @@ Hash Digest
|
|||
Hash Function
|
||||
A function used to map data of arbitrary size to fixed-size values (see {term}`Hash Digest`).
|
||||
|
||||
Hash Value
|
||||
See {term}`Hash Digest`.
|
||||
|
||||
Hashed Area
|
||||
An area in an {term}`OpenPGP Signature Packet` containing {term}`OpenPGP Signature Subpacket`s, that is covered by the {term}`Hash Digest` a {term}`Cryptographic Signature` is created for. See [](subpacket-areas).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -209,10 +223,14 @@ Hybrid Cryptosystem
|
|||
A cryptographic system that employs both {term}`Asymmetric Cryptography` and {term}`Symmetric Cryptography`. See [](hybrid-cryptosystems).
|
||||
|
||||
Identity
|
||||
An identity of a {term}`Certificate Holder`. It is represented by an {term}`Identity Component`, which may be certified using {term}`third-party identity certifications<Third-party Identity Certification>`, or by a {term}`Notation`.
|
||||
An identity of a {term}`Certificate Holder`. It is represented by an {term}`Identity Component`, which may be certified using {term}`identity certifications<Identity Certification>`, or by a {term}`Notation`.
|
||||
|
||||
Identity Certification
|
||||
An {term}`OpenPGP Signature Packet` on an {term}`Identity Component` which {term}`certifies<Certification>` its {term}`authenticity<Authentication>`.
|
||||
|
||||
Identity certifications can be issued either:
|
||||
- by the certificate holder, as a {term}`self-signature`, or
|
||||
- by a third party, as a {term}`third-party identity certifications<Third-party Identity Certification>`.
|
||||
|
||||
Identity Claim
|
||||
A {term}`Certificate Holder` may use {term}`Identity Components<Identity Component>` or {term}`Notations<Notation>` to state a claim about their {term}`Identity`.
|
||||
|
|
@ -237,7 +255,7 @@ Inline Signature
|
|||
For more context, see [](forms-of-data-signatures).
|
||||
|
||||
Issuer
|
||||
An entity, that created an {term}`OpenPGP Signature Packet` using an {term}`Transferable Secret Key`.
|
||||
An entity, that created an {term}`OpenPGP Signature Packet` using a {term}`Transferable Secret Key`.
|
||||
|
||||
Issuer Fingerprint Subpacket
|
||||
A {term}`Subpacket` specifying the {term}`Fingerprint` of an {term}`Issuer Key`.
|
||||
|
|
@ -263,7 +281,7 @@ Key
|
|||
- {term}`OpenPGP key` (which in turn refers to either an {term}`OpenPGP Certificate` or a {term}`Transferable Secret Key`
|
||||
|
||||
Key Expiration Time Subpacket
|
||||
An {term}`OpenPGP Signature Subpacket Type` which defines the {term}`Expiration Time` for an {term}`OpenPGP Signature Packet` on a {term}`key<Component Key>`.
|
||||
An {term}`OpenPGP Signature Subpacket Type` which defines the {term}`Expiration Time` for a {term}`key<Component Key>`.
|
||||
|
||||
See [RFC 5.2.3.13](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-key-expiration-time)
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -287,7 +305,7 @@ Key Revocation Signature Packet
|
|||
A {term}`Revocation Self-signature` for an entire {term}`OpenPGP Certificate`.
|
||||
|
||||
Key Server
|
||||
A piece of software available over the network, which provides access to {term}`OpenPGP Certificates<OpenPGP Certificate>` e.g., by searching for an {term}`OpenPGP Fingerprint` or {term}`User ID`, via the `HKP` and/ or `HKPS` protocols.
|
||||
A service available over the network, which provides access to {term}`OpenPGP Certificates<OpenPGP Certificate>` e.g., by searching for an {term}`OpenPGP Fingerprint` or {term}`User ID`, via the `HKP` and/ or `HKPS` protocols.
|
||||
Several implementations such as [hagrid](https://gitlab.com/keys.openpgp.org/hagrid/), or [hockeypuck](https://github.com/hockeypuck/hockeypuck) exist.
|
||||
|
||||
Life-cycle Management
|
||||
|
|
@ -296,7 +314,11 @@ Life-cycle Management
|
|||
See [](self-signatures).
|
||||
|
||||
Literal Data Packet
|
||||
A {term}`packet` which contains a payload of data. It represents a "literal message". A literal data packet can for example store data that has been signed using a {term}`cryptographic signature`. See [RFC 5.9](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#lit) for more details.
|
||||
A {term}`packet` that contains a payload of data. It represents a "literal message".
|
||||
|
||||
A literal data packet typically stores the paintext data of an encrypted message, and/or the data of an inline signed message.
|
||||
|
||||
See [RFC 5.9](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#lit).
|
||||
|
||||
MAC
|
||||
See {term}`Message Authentication Code`.
|
||||
|
|
@ -307,8 +329,10 @@ Master Key
|
|||
Message Authentication Code
|
||||
A piece of information used for integrity and {term}`authenticity<Authentication>` verification of a message. See [](message-authentication-code).
|
||||
|
||||
Meta-Introducer
|
||||
An {term}`OpenPGP Certificate` with a {term}`Trust Depth` greater than one.
|
||||
Meta Introducer
|
||||
An {term}`OpenPGP Certificate` that acts as a {term}`Trusted introducer` and has a {term}`Trust Depth` greater than one.
|
||||
|
||||
A meta introducer can introduce other (meta-) {term}`introducers<Trusted introducer>`.
|
||||
|
||||
Metadata
|
||||
Data related to preferences of an {term}`OpenPGP Certificate` or its {term}`Certificate Holder`, that can be found in {term}`signature` {term}`packets<Packet>`. See [](metadata-in-certificates).
|
||||
|
|
@ -394,7 +418,7 @@ Owner
|
|||
See {term}`Certificate Holder`.
|
||||
|
||||
Packet
|
||||
An element in an {term}`OpenPGP Certificate` or {term}`message<OpenPGP Message>`.
|
||||
An element in an {term}`OpenPGP Certificate` or {term}`OpenPGP Message`.
|
||||
|
||||
Packet Header
|
||||
A section of variable length at the beginning of a {term}`Packet`, which encodes for example the {term}`Packet Type ID`. See the relevant [section in the RFC](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-packet-headers), which explains this section in more detail.
|
||||
|
|
@ -411,22 +435,22 @@ Positive Certification
|
|||
See [](bind-identity).
|
||||
|
||||
Preferred Compression Algorithms Subpacket
|
||||
An {term}`OpenPGP Signature Subpacket Type` which defines the preferred {term}`compression algorithms<Data Compression>` for an {term}`OpenPGP Signature Packet`. This defines which {term}`algorithms<Data Compression>` the {term}`key holder<Certificate Holder>` prefers to use.
|
||||
An {term}`OpenPGP Signature Subpacket Type` which defines the preferred {term}`compression algorithms<Data Compression>` for an {term}`OpenPGP Certificate` or {term}`Component Key`. This defines which {term}`algorithms<Data Compression>` the {term}`key holder<Certificate Holder>` prefers to receive.
|
||||
|
||||
See [RFC 5.2.3.17](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-preferred-compression-algor).
|
||||
|
||||
Preferred Hash Algorithms Subpacket
|
||||
An {term}`OpenPGP Signature Subpacket Type` which defines the preferred {term}`hash algorithm<Hash Function>` for an {term}`OpenPGP Signature Packet`. This defines which algorithms the {term}`key holder<Certificate Holder>` prefers to receive.
|
||||
An {term}`OpenPGP Signature Subpacket Type` which defines the preferred {term}`hash algorithm<Hash Function>` for an {term}`OpenPGP Certificate` or {term}`Component Key`. This defines which algorithms the {term}`key holder<Certificate Holder>` prefers to receive.
|
||||
|
||||
See [RFC 5.2.3.16](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-preferred-hash-algorithms).
|
||||
|
||||
Preferred Symmetric Ciphers for v1 SEIPD Subpacket
|
||||
An {term}`OpenPGP Signature Subpacket Type` which defines the preferred version 1 {term}`SEIPD<Symmetrically Encrypted Integrity Protected Data>` algorithms for an {term}`OpenPGP Signature Packet`. This defines which algorithms the {term}`key holder<Certificate Holder>` prefers to receive and implicitly signifies the supported algorithms of the {term}`key holder<Certificate Holder>`'s {term}`implementation<OpenPGP Implementation>`.
|
||||
An {term}`OpenPGP Signature Subpacket Type` which defines the preferred version 1 {term}`SEIPD<Symmetrically Encrypted Integrity Protected Data>` algorithms for an {term}`OpenPGP Certificate` or {term}`Component Key`. This defines which algorithms the {term}`key holder<Certificate Holder>` prefers to receive and implicitly signifies the supported algorithms of the {term}`key holder<Certificate Holder>`'s {term}`implementation<OpenPGP Implementation>`.
|
||||
|
||||
See [RFC 5.2.3.14](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-preferred-symmetric-ciphers).
|
||||
|
||||
Preferred AEAD Ciphersuites Subpacket
|
||||
An {term}`OpenPGP Signature Subpacket Type` which defines the preferred version 2 {term}`SEIPD<Symmetrically Encrypted Integrity Protected Data>` algorithms for an {term}`OpenPGP Signature Packet`. This defines which algorithms the {term}`key holder<Certificate Holder>` prefers to receive and implicitly signifies the supported algorithms of the {term}`key holder<Certificate Holder>`'s {term}`implementation<OpenPGP Implementation>`.
|
||||
An {term}`OpenPGP Signature Subpacket Type` which defines the preferred version 2 {term}`SEIPD<Symmetrically Encrypted Integrity Protected Data>` algorithms for an {term}`OpenPGP Certificate` or {term}`Component Key`. This defines which algorithms the {term}`key holder<Certificate Holder>` prefers to receive and implicitly signifies the supported algorithms of the {term}`key holder<Certificate Holder>`'s {term}`implementation<OpenPGP Implementation>`.
|
||||
|
||||
See [RFC 5.2.3.15](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-preferred-aead-ciphersuites)
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -490,7 +514,7 @@ Reason For Revocation Subpacket
|
|||
See [RFC 5.2.3.31](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-reason-for-revocation)
|
||||
|
||||
Reference Time
|
||||
A point in time at which an {term}`OpenPGP Certificate` is evaluated.
|
||||
A point in time at which an {term}`OpenPGP Certificate` or {term}`OpenPGP Signature` is evaluated.
|
||||
|
||||
Regular Expression Subpacket
|
||||
An {term}`OpenPGP Signature Subpacket` which allows for limiting {term}`delegations<Delegation>` to {term}`identities<Identity>` matching a regular expression.
|
||||
|
|
@ -580,7 +604,7 @@ Signature Type
|
|||
See {term}`OpenPGP Signature Type`.
|
||||
|
||||
Signature Type ID
|
||||
A numerical identifier for a {term}`Signature Type`.
|
||||
A numerical identifier for a {term}`Signature Type<OpenPGP Signature Type>`.
|
||||
|
||||
Signature Verification
|
||||
In cryptography the mechanism of verification relates to a process in which a claim (i.e., a {term}`signature`) is tested (i.e., using the relevant {term}`components<Component>` of a {term}`certificate`).
|
||||
|
|
@ -638,7 +662,7 @@ Text Signature
|
|||
A {term}`signature packet<OpenPGP signature packet>` with the {term}`Signature Type ID` `0x01`, which is used for textual data.
|
||||
|
||||
Third-party Identity Certification
|
||||
{term}`Certification` by third-parties to confirm ownership of an {term}`OpenPGP Certificate` by a {term}`Certificate Holder`. See [](third-party-identity-certifications).
|
||||
{term}`Certification` by third-parties to confirm ownership of an {term}`OpenPGP Certificate` ({term}`Identity Claim`) by a {term}`Certificate Holder`. See [](third-party-identity-certifications).
|
||||
|
||||
Third-party Signature
|
||||
A {term}`Signature` by a third-party on a {term}`Component` of a {term}`Certificate`.
|
||||
|
|
@ -678,7 +702,7 @@ Trust Signature
|
|||
Trusted introducer
|
||||
OpenPGP users can choose to rely on {term}`certifications<Certification>` issued by a third party. The remote party of such a {term}`delegation` is called a "trusted introducer".
|
||||
|
||||
See {ref}`delegation` for more details.
|
||||
See [](delegation) for more details.
|
||||
|
||||
TSK
|
||||
See {term}`Transferable Secret Key`.
|
||||
|
|
@ -696,7 +720,7 @@ Unhashed Subpacket
|
|||
A {term}`Signature Subpacket` residing in the {term}`Unhashed Area` of a {term}`Signature Packet`.
|
||||
|
||||
User Attribute
|
||||
An {term}`Identity Component`, which may hold a single JPEG image. See [](user-attributes).
|
||||
An {term}`Identity Component`, which may hold complex attribute data, e.g. a single JPEG image. See [](user-attributes).
|
||||
|
||||
User ID
|
||||
An {term}`Identity Component`, which describes an {term}`Identity` of a {term}`Certificate Holder`. See [](user-ids).
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ This chapter expands on topics introduced in the [](certificates) chapter.
|
|||
{term}`Life-cycle management` operations include:
|
||||
|
||||
- {term}`binding<Binding Signature>` additional {term}`components<Component>` to a {term}`certificate<OpenPGP Certificate>`
|
||||
- modifying {term}`expiration time` or other {term}`metadata` of `components<Component>`
|
||||
- modifying {term}`expiration time` or other {term}`metadata` of {term}`components<Component>`
|
||||
- revoking, and thus invalidating, {term}`components<Component>` or existing {term}`self-signatures<Self-signature>`
|
||||
|
||||
{term}`Self-signatures<Self-signature>` are issued by the {term}`certificate's owner<Certificate Holder>` using the {term}`certificate<OpenPGP Certificate>`'s {term}`primary key<OpenPGP Primary Key>`.
|
||||
|
|
@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ OpenPGP uses [*trust signature*](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-open
|
|||
(trust-level)=
|
||||
#### Trust depth/level
|
||||
|
||||
The "{term}`trust depth`" (or {term}`level<Trust Depth>`) in OpenPGP signifies the extent of transitive {term}`delegation` within the {term}`authentication` process. It determines how far a {term}`delegation` can be extended from the original {term}`trusted introducer` to subsequent intermediaries. Essentially, a {term}`certificate<OpenPGP Certificate>` with a {term}`trust depth` of more than one acts as a "{term}`meta-introducer`," facilitating {term}`authentication` decisions across multiple levels in the network.
|
||||
The "{term}`trust depth`" (or {term}`level<Trust Depth>`) in OpenPGP signifies the extent of transitive {term}`delegation` within the {term}`authentication` process. It determines how far a {term}`delegation` can be extended from the original {term}`trusted introducer` to subsequent intermediaries. Essentially, a {term}`certificate<OpenPGP Certificate>` with a {term}`trust depth` of more than one acts as a "{term}`meta introducer`," facilitating {term}`authentication` decisions across multiple levels in the network.
|
||||
|
||||
A {term}`trust depth` of 1 means relying on {term}`certifications<Certification>` made directly by the {term}`trusted introducer`. The user's OpenPGP software will accept {term}`certifications<Certification>` made directly by the {term}`introducer<Trusted Introducer>` for {term}`authenticating<Authentication>` identities.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ With this mechanism, for example, it is possible to {term}`delegate<Delegation>`
|
|||
(wot)=
|
||||
### Web of Trust: Decentralized trust decisions
|
||||
|
||||
The {term}`Web of Trust` in OpenPGP is a {term}`trust model` that facilitates {term}`authentication` decisions through a network of {term}`certifications<Certification>` and {term}`delegations<Delegation>`. It is characterized by a so-called [strong set](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_of_trust#Strong_set), which refers to a group of {term}`certificates<OpenPGP Certificate>` that are robustly interconnected via `third-party certifications<Third-party Identity Certification>`.
|
||||
The {term}`Web of Trust` in OpenPGP is a {term}`trust model` that facilitates {term}`authentication` decisions through a network of {term}`certifications<Certification>` and {term}`delegations<Delegation>`. It is characterized by a so-called [strong set](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_of_trust#Strong_set), which refers to a group of {term}`certificates<OpenPGP Certificate>` that are robustly interconnected via {term}`third-party certifications<Third-party Identity Certification>`.
|
||||
|
||||
In this model, users independently {term}`delegate<Delegation>` {term}`authentication` decisions, choosing whose {term}`certification` to rely on. This {term}`delegation` is based on the {term}`certificates<OpenPGP Certificate>` and {term}`third-party signatures<Third-party Signature>` available to them, with their {term}`OpenPGP software<OpenPGP Implementation>` applying the {term}`Web of Trust` mechanism to discern the reliability of each {term}`certificate<OpenPGP Certificate>` for an {term}`identity`.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue