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Improve on original text: "Elements" encompass both "components" and "signatures." Regarding malicious addition, we care about both.

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Additionally, "typically" reads confusingly weak to me, erring on the side of "maybe too strong" with "will" seems better.
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Heiko Schaefer 2023-11-25 14:56:17 +01:00
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book/source/08-signing_components.md
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@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Self-signatures play a crucial role in forming and managing the structure of Ope
Internally, an OpenPGP certificate is essentially a series of packets strung sequentially. When a certificate is stored in a file format known as a [transferable public key](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-10.html#name-transferable-public-keys), packets can be easily added or removed.
To safeguard against unauthorized additions, OpenPGP uses cryptographic signatures. These validate that any additions, such as subkeys or [identity components](identity_components), were made by the owner of the OpenPGP certificate using its primary key. While anyone can still store unrelated subkeys and identity components to a certificate dataset, OpenPGP implementations typically reject components lacking a valid cryptographic connection with the certificate.
To safeguard against unauthorized additions, OpenPGP uses cryptographic signatures. These validate that any additions, such as subkeys or [identity components](identity_components), were made by the owner of the OpenPGP certificate using its primary key. While anyone can still store unrelated elements to a certificate dataset, OpenPGP implementations will reject them if they lack a valid cryptographic connection with the certificate.
```{note}
Conversely, omissions of packets by third parties can easily occur when handling an OpenPGP certificate dataset. This could pose a challenge, for example, when an attacker deliberately omits revocation packets. Without access to an alternative, complete certificate source, recipients might not detect these omissions.