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book/source/06-signatures.md
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@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Without signatures, there would only be loose keys, impossible to associate with
## Terminology ## Terminology
The term *signature* can have multiple meanings in the context of OpenPGP: The term *signature* can have two different meanings in the context of OpenPGP:
- Cryptographic keys create raw signatures which are byte sequences calculated according to some signature scheme. - Cryptographic keys create raw signatures which are byte sequences calculated according to some signature scheme.
- [*OpenPGP signature packets*](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-signature-packet-type-id-2), which combine a *type* setting, additional metadata, and a raw cryptographic signature. - [*OpenPGP signature packets*](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-signature-packet-type-id-2), which combine a *type* setting, additional metadata, and a raw cryptographic signature.
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ An overview of signature types in OpenPGP
Group "Third-Party Certification" and "Self-Signature" as "Signature on components", in the diagram? Group "Third-Party Certification" and "Self-Signature" as "Signature on components", in the diagram?
``` ```
In this chapter, we discuss the general principles of OpenPGP signatures, which apply to all types of OpenPGP signatures. In this chapter we discuss general principles, which apply to all types of OpenPGP signatures.
For more detail about specific types of signatures, see the chapters {ref}`signing_data` and {ref}`component_signatures_chapter`, respectively. For more detail about specific types of signatures, see the chapters {ref}`signing_data` and {ref}`component_signatures_chapter`, respectively.
@ -83,29 +83,33 @@ The exact input data depends on the signature type. However, the input data alwa
(signature_subpackets)= (signature_subpackets)=
## Signature subpackets ## Signature subpackets
Just a cryptographic signature, combined with a signature type identifier, is often not sufficiently expressive. For this reason, the OpenPGP protocol introduced signature subpackets (in [RFC 2440](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2440)). A bare cryptographic signature - even when combined with a signature type ID - is usually not sufficiently expressive. So, to encode additional metadata in signature packets, the OpenPGP protocol introduced signature subpackets (in [RFC 2440](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2440)).
Subpackets are well-defined data structures that can be placed into signature packets as subelements. They give additional context and meaning to a signature. Subpackets encode data in a key-value format. All possible keys are defined in the RFC as [subpacket type IDs](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-signature-subpacket-types-r), and the value format (and meaning) are defined in the RFC for each subpacket type ID. Subpackets are well-defined data structures that can be placed into signature packets as sub-elements. They provide additional context and meaning for a signature. Subpackets encode data in a key-value format. The RFC defines all possible keys as [subpacket type IDs](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-signature-subpacket-types-r) and provides the value format (and meaning) for all of them.
Typical examples are: Typical examples are:
- the [*issuer fingerprint*](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#issuer-fingerprint-subpacket) subpacket, which contains the fingerprint of the issuer key, or - The [*issuer fingerprint*](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#issuer-fingerprint-subpacket) subpacket, which encodes the fingerprint of the component key that issued the signature, or
- the [*key flags*](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-key-flags) subpacket which defines what purpose a component key is used for, in a certificate. - The [*key flags*](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-key-flags) subpacket, that defines which capabilities are assigned to a component key, in a certificate.
Signature subpackets can reside in two different areas of a signature packet: ### Hashed and unhashed signature subpackets
- Subpackets in the *hashed area* are incorporated in the digest calculation that is done during signature calculation and are therefore covered by the cryptographic signature. In other words; hashed subpackets are *authenticated*. Signature subpackets can reside in [two different areas](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-hashed-vs-unhashed-subpacke) of a signature packet:
- If a subpacket is placed in the *unhashed area* instead, it is not included in the signature calculation procedure and is therefore not protected against tampering. The unhashed area can be used to retroactively add, change or remove subpackets from a signature without invalidating it. Since the unhashed area doesn't provide any cryptographic guarantees, it is only intended for advisory packets, or packets that self-authenticate (e.g. the issuer fingerprint subpacket, whose "correctness" can be proven by successfully verifying the signature using the referenced issuer key).
- Subpackets in the *hashed area* are included in the hash digest for that signature. In other words: hashed subpackets are covered by the cryptographic signature in the signature packet. Recipients of the signature can be sure that these subpackets express the intent of the issuer of the signature.
- Subpackets in the *unhashed area*, by contrast, are not included in the hash digest for that signature. They are therefore not protected against tampering. The unhashed area can be used to retroactively add, change or remove metadata in a signature packet, without invalidating it. Since the unhashed area doesn't provide any cryptographic guarantees, it is only intended for advisory packets, or packets that self-authenticate (e.g. the issuer fingerprint subpacket, whose "correctness" can be proven by successfully verifying the signature using the referenced issuer key).
In most cases, signature subpackets are stored in the hashed area. In most cases, signature subpackets are stored in the hashed area.
### Criticality of subpackets ### Criticality of subpackets
Each signature subpacket has a flag that indicates whether the subpacket is *critical*. Each signature subpacket has a flag that indicates whether the subpacket is *critical*. When set, the criticality flag signals that a receiving implementation that does not know a subpacket type, must consider this an error, and may not consider the signature valid.
Since different OpenPGP implementations might support subsets of the standard, it would be fatal if, for example, an implementation did not understand the concept of signature expiration. Such an implementation would potentially accept an already expired signature. The reason for this mechanism is that OpenPGP implementations may only support subsets of the standard - and the standard may be extended over time, including by the addition of new subpacket types.
By marking the expiration date subpacket as critical, the user can indicate that implementations that do not understand this type of subpacket are supposed to reject the signature as invalid.
RFC Sections [5.2.3.11](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-signature-creation-time) - [5.2.3.36](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-intended-recipient-fingerpr) give guidance on which subpackets are usually marked as critical. However, it would be fatal if, for example, an implementation did not understand the concept of signature expiration. Such an implementation would potentially accept an already expired signature.
By marking the expiration date subpacket as critical, the creating implementation can indicate that recipients who do not understand this of subpacket must consider the signature as invalid.
RFC Sections [5.2.3.11](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-signature-creation-time) - [5.2.3.36](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-intended-recipient-fingerpr) give guidance on which subpackets should be marked as critical.
## Advanced topics ## Advanced topics