book/source/adv/certificates.md

@@ -190,14 +190,13 @@ Overall, certificate minimization for email presents a promising approach to enh
 
 [^space-example]: This example demonstrates how to minimize a certificate using GnuPG commands, targeting only relevant components:
 
-    ```sh
-    gpg --export-options export-minimal,export-clean,no-export-attributes \
-        --export-filter keep-uid=mbox=wiktor@metacode.biz \
-        --export-filter 'drop-subkey=expired -t || revoked -t || usage =~ a' \
-        --export wiktor@metacode.biz
-    ```
+```sh
+gpg --export-options export-minimal,export-clean,no-export-attributes \
+    --export-filter keep-uid=mbox=wiktor@metacode.biz \
+    --export-filter 'drop-subkey=expired -t || revoked -t || usage =~ a' \
+    --export wiktor@metacode.biz
 
-    The process significantly reduces the certificate size from 152,322 bytes to just 3,771 bytes, demonstrating a substantial decrease in size by over 40 times. Such minimization is particularly crucial in contexts with strict size limitations, like embedding certificate data in email headers.
+The process significantly reduces the certificate size from 152,322 bytes to just 3,771 bytes, demonstrating a substantial decrease in size by over 40 times. Such minimization is particularly crucial in contexts with strict size limitations, like embedding certificate data in email headers.
 
 ## Identifying certificates: Fingerprints and Key IDs
 
@@ -209,9 +208,9 @@ This section delves into the evolution of these identifiers, their practical app
 
 The development of fingerprints within the OpenPGP framework reflects ongoing efforts to bolster security measures and align with current cryptographic standards. Initially, fingerprints were shorter and derived using less secure hashing algorithms. As cryptographic standards advanced, the need for longer, more secure fingerprints became apparent, leading to the adoption of longer hash functions to generate these identifiers.
 
-**Version 4 fingerprints**: OpenPGP version 4 introduced 20-byte (160-bit) fingerprints, generated using the SHA-1 hashing algorithm. These fingerprints became the standard for identifying certificates, with their hexadecimal representation commonly used in various user workflows. Activities such as verifying a new contact's certificate or issuing third-party certifications often required manual comparison of these fingerprints, highlighting their centrality to OpenPGP's trust-building processes.
+- **Version 4 fingerprints**: OpenPGP version 4 introduced 20-byte (160-bit) fingerprints, generated using the SHA-1 hashing algorithm. These fingerprints became the standard for identifying certificates, with their hexadecimal representation commonly used in various user workflows. Activities such as verifying a new contact's certificate or issuing third-party certifications often required manual comparison of these fingerprints, highlighting their centrality to OpenPGP's trust-building processes.
 
-**Version 6 fingerprints**: The OpenPGP version 6 standards transition to 32-byte (256-bit) fingerprints, enhancing security through the use of stronger hash functions. However, due to the challenges humans face in comparing high-entropy data, [version 6 explicitly recommends against using these longer fingerprints](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-fingerprint-usability) in user-facing contexts, advocating instead for "mechanical fingerprint transfer and comparison" whenever possible. This shift underscores the evolving considerations around the usability and security of certificate identifiers[^schuermann].
+- **Version 6 fingerprints**: The OpenPGP version 6 standards transition to 32-byte (256-bit) fingerprints, enhancing security through the use of stronger hash functions. However, due to the challenges humans face in comparing high-entropy data, [version 6 explicitly recommends against using these longer fingerprints](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-fingerprint-usability) in user-facing contexts, advocating instead for "mechanical fingerprint transfer and comparison" whenever possible. This shift underscores the evolving considerations around the usability and security of certificate identifiers[^schuermann].
 
 [^schuermann]: See "An Empirical Study of Textual Key-Fingerprint Representations" [<https://www.ibr.cs.tu-bs.de/papers/schuermann-usenix2016.pdf>](https://www.ibr.cs.tu-bs.de/papers/schuermann-usenix2016.pdf)
 
@@ -228,9 +227,9 @@ In essence, fingerprints and Key IDs are crucial for software to programmaticall
 
 A common use case of fingerprints and Key IDs, crucial for day-to-day secure communications, is locating an OpenPGP certificate associated with an email address. 
 
-**[Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service/)** and **[Hagrid](https://keys.openpgp.org/)** exemplify systems that leverage these identifiers for secure and privacy-respecting certificate lookup by email, enhancing the reliability of encrypted email communications.
+- **[Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service/)** and **[Hagrid](https://keys.openpgp.org/)** exemplify systems that leverage these identifiers for secure and privacy-respecting certificate lookup by email, enhancing the reliability of encrypted email communications.
 
-**SKS-style keyservers** represent a more traditional approach to certificate distribution. Despite their age, these keyservers continue to play a role in the OpenPGP ecosystem. Today, most of these run the [Hockeypuck](https://github.com/hockeypuck/hockeypuck) software, which helps secure the keyserver infrastructure. SKS-style keyservers use fingerprints and Key IDs for certificate indexing and retrieval, underscoring the universal applicability of these identifiers in enhancing email security across various platforms.
+- **SKS-style keyservers** represent a more traditional approach to certificate distribution. Despite their age, these keyservers continue to play a role in the OpenPGP ecosystem. Today, most of these run the [Hockeypuck](https://github.com/hockeypuck/hockeypuck) software, which helps secure the keyserver infrastructure. SKS-style keyservers use fingerprints and Key IDs for certificate indexing and retrieval, underscoring the universal applicability of these identifiers in enhancing email security across various platforms.
 
 While their properties differ, these mechanisms showcase the indispensable role of fingerprints and Key IDs in facilitating secure email exchanges within the OpenPGP ecosystem.
 
@@ -243,34 +242,45 @@ The OpenPGP ecosystem employs various mechanisms for the distribution and retrie
 
 The Web Key Directory (WKD) offers a decentralized solution for the distribution of OpenPGP certificates, enabling domain owners to host OpenPGP keys on their own web servers. This approach provides a direct, user-friendly method for retrieving certificates based on email addresses, aligning with OpenPGP's trust and privacy principles.
 
-**Decentralization and domain control**: WKD's decentralized framework allows for the hosting of certificates in a well-known location on a webserver, managed by the entity controlling the DNS domain of an email-based identity. This model empowers domain owners with direct control over the certificates associated with their domain, enhancing security and trustworthiness. The decentralization aspect ensures that the reliability and availability of OpenPGP certificates can vary depending on the organization operating each WKD instance, allowing for tailored security practices and policies.
+- **Decentralization and domain control**: WKD's decentralized framework allows for the hosting of certificates in a well-known location on a webserver, managed by the entity controlling the DNS domain of an email-based identity. This model empowers domain owners with direct control over the certificates associated with their domain, enhancing security and trustworthiness. The decentralization aspect ensures that the reliability and availability of OpenPGP certificates can vary depending on the organization operating each WKD instance, allowing for tailored security practices and policies.
 
-**Privacy and autonomy**: By facilitating a method of certificate distribution that does not rely on centralized keyserver networks, WKD inherently supports privacy by minimizing exposure to third-party tracking or control. Users and domain owners can manage certificate distribution autonomously, providing a privacy-centric alternative to traditional keyservers.
+- **Privacy and autonomy**: By facilitating a method of certificate distribution that does not rely on centralized keyserver networks, WKD inherently supports privacy by minimizing exposure to third-party tracking or control. Users and domain owners can manage certificate distribution autonomously, providing a privacy-centric alternative to traditional keyservers.
 
-**Seamless integration with email systems**: WKD leverages the existing infrastructure of email addresses and domain names for smooth integration with email clients. This supports the automatic discovery and retrieval of certificates, streamlining the process for end-users. Such seamless integration ensures that certificates are always current, making secure communication more accessible and manageable.
+- **Seamless integration with email systems**: WKD leverages the existing infrastructure of email addresses and domain names for smooth integration with email clients. This supports the automatic discovery and retrieval of certificates, streamlining the process for end-users. Such seamless integration ensures that certificates are always current, making secure communication more accessible and manageable.
 
 ### keys.openpgp.org (Hagrid)
 
 Hagrid, the software powering the keys.openpgp.org service, represents a paradigm shift in keyserver design, focusing on verifying user identities and safeguarding privacy. This "verifying" keyserver model is distinctive for its approach to managing identity components associated with OpenPGP certificates.
 
-**Trust and verification**: Hagrid introduces a rigorous verification process, wherein identity components (including email addresses) are only published after the keyserver has sent a verification email to the address in question and received explicit opt-in consent from the user. This verification mechanism ensures that all published certificates are authentically linked to their claimed identities, significantly mitigating risks of impersonation and unauthorized certificate publication.
+- **Trust and verification**: Hagrid introduces a rigorous verification process, wherein identity components (including email addresses) are only published after the keyserver has sent a verification email to the address in question and received explicit opt-in consent from the user. This verification mechanism ensures that all published certificates are authentically linked to their claimed identities, significantly mitigating risks of impersonation and unauthorized certificate publication.
 
-**Centralization and privacy considerations**: Unlike traditional, decentralized keyservers, Hagrid operates on a centralized model, which necessitates trust in the operator to accurately perform verification steps. However, this centralization facilitates a trade-off that enhances privacy: Hagrid prevents the "enumeration" of certificates and identities, meaning third parties cannot simply list or query all email addresses stored in the service's database. This feature is critical for user privacy and control over personal information in the digital space.
+- **Centralization and privacy considerations**: Unlike traditional, decentralized keyservers, Hagrid operates on a centralized model, which necessitates trust in the operator to accurately perform verification steps. However, this centralization facilitates a trade-off that enhances privacy: Hagrid prevents the "enumeration" of certificates and identities, meaning third parties cannot simply list or query all email addresses stored in the service's database. This feature is critical for user privacy and control over personal information in the digital space.
 
-**User control and anti-spam measures**: By implementing a model that publishes identity information solely with user consent, Hagrid empowers users with unparalleled control over their digital identities. This approach not only protects users' privacy but also contributes to a cleaner, more reliable directory of certificates, devoid of spam and irrelevant data. Furthermore, Hagrid's design simplifies the publication of revocations, enabling users to easily update or invalidate their certificates without necessitating the publication of additional identity components.
+- **User control and anti-spam measures**: By implementing a model that publishes identity information solely with user consent, Hagrid empowers users with unparalleled control over their digital identities. This approach not only protects users' privacy but also contributes to a cleaner, more reliable directory of certificates, devoid of spam and irrelevant data. Furthermore, Hagrid's design simplifies the publication of revocations, enabling users to easily update or invalidate their certificates without necessitating the publication of additional identity components.
 
 ### SKS-style keyservers: Challenges and solutions
 
 SKS-style keyservers have historically facilitated the exchange of OpenPGP certificates within a distributed, unverified database framework. While instrumental in the OpenPGP ecosystem, this model has encountered significant challenges, particularly related to security and privacy.
 
-**Security and privacy concerns**: The openness of SKS-style keyservers has exposed them to certificate flooding attacks, where attackers inundate a key with excessive, often malicious, signatures. This not only disrupts operational efficiency but also raises privacy concerns, as these servers indiscriminately distribute third-party certifications and identity packets, potentially without the certificate owner's consent.
+- **Security and privacy concerns**: The openness of SKS-style keyservers has exposed them to certificate flooding attacks, where attackers inundate a key with excessive, often malicious, signatures. This not only disrupts operational efficiency but also raises privacy concerns, as these servers indiscriminately distribute third-party certifications and identity packets, potentially without the certificate owner's consent.
 
-**Adaptive responses and Hockeypuck's role**: In response, the OpenPGP community has sought solutions to these vulnerabilities. Hockeypuck, an advanced keyserver software, exemplifies these efforts by aiming to enhance security and data integrity, directly addressing the limitations of the traditional SKS architecture. One notable discussion within the community ([GitHub issue #136](https://github.com/hockeypuck/hockeypuck/issues/136)) focuses on proposals like HIP-1, aiming to provide key owners with more control over their certificates on keyservers, thus mitigating risks such as certificate flooding.
+- **Adaptive responses and Hockeypuck's role**: In response, the OpenPGP community has sought solutions to these vulnerabilities. Hockeypuck, an advanced keyserver software, exemplifies these efforts by aiming to enhance security and data integrity, directly addressing the limitations of the traditional SKS architecture. One notable discussion within the community ([GitHub issue #136](https://github.com/hockeypuck/hockeypuck/issues/136)) focuses on proposals like HIP-1, aiming to provide key owners with more control over their certificates on keyservers, thus mitigating risks such as certificate flooding.
 
-**Evolving towards more secure models**: This transition from SKS-style servers to more controlled, secure models signifies a broader shift within the OpenPGP community. Newer mechanisms like WKD and Hagrid illustrate this evolution, offering more privacy-respecting and user-centric approaches to certificate distribution. Hagrid, in particular, introduces a verifying keyserver model that only distributes verified identity information, a stark contrast to the traditional SKS system's approach.
+- **Evolving towards more secure models**: This transition from SKS-style servers to more controlled, secure models signifies a broader shift within the OpenPGP community. Newer mechanisms like WKD and Hagrid illustrate this evolution, offering more privacy-respecting and user-centric approaches to certificate distribution. Hagrid, in particular, introduces a verifying keyserver model that only distributes verified identity information, a stark contrast to the traditional SKS system's approach.
 
 The progression from SKS-style keyservers to innovative solutions like Hockeypuck and Hagrid demonstrates the OpenPGP community's commitment to safeguarding the OpenPGP ecosystem against evolving threats, ensuring a more secure and reliable infrastructure for certificate distribution.
 
+(certificate-freshness)=
+## Certificate freshness: Triggering updates with an expiration time
+
+For a certificate holder, one problem is that their communication partners may not regularly poll for updates of their certificate.
+
+A certificate holder usually prefers that everyone else regularly obtains updates for their certificate. This way, a third party will, for example, not mistakenly keep using the certificate indefinitely, after it gets revoked. Setting an expiration time on the certificate, ahead of time, limits the worst case scenario: communication partners will at most use a revoked certificate until its expiration time, even if they never learn of the revocation.
+
+Once the expiration time is reached, third parties, or ideally their OpenPGP software will have to stop using the certificate, and may attempt to obtain an update for it. For example, from a keyserver, or via WKD. Ideally, certificate updates are obtained automatically, by the user's OpenPGP software, without any need for human intervention.
+
+After the update, the updated copy of the certificate will usually have a fresh expiration time. The same procedure will repeat once that new expiration time has been reached.
+
 ## Challenges in certificate management
 
 The management of OpenPGP certificates encompasses various challenges, ranging from security vulnerabilities to privacy concerns. This section addresses some of the most significant challenges and the responses developed by the OpenPGP community to mitigate these issues.
@@ -293,9 +303,7 @@ The OpenPGP community has evolved strategies to counter certificate flooding, no
 
 Keyserver designs have adapted to these challenges. For example, the keys.openpgp.org (KOO) service, designed with [GDPR compliance](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Data_Protection_Regulation) and flooding resistance in mind, only serves identity components after explicit user consent via email verification. It doesn't distribute third-party certifications by default, avoiding flooding. 
 
-Furthermore, KOO, Hockeypuck keyserver software, and Sequoia's `sq` command-line tool have plans to support or already support 1pa3pc, demonstrating the community's proactive stance on enhancing certificate security. See how [KOO supports 1pa3pc](https://gitlab.com/keys.openpgp.org/hagrid/-/commit/39c0e12ac64588220d36bada6497d8396f5915b3), [Hockeypuck's statement on "HIP 1: Regaining control over public key identity with authenticated key management"](https://github.com/hockeypuck/hockeypuck/wiki/HIP-1:-Regaining-control-over-public-key-identity-with-authenticated-key-management) and [Sequoia's support](https://man.archlinux.org/man/sq-key-attest-certifications.1).
-
-It's also noteworthy that the mechanism of 1pa3pc relies on the *attested certifications* signature subpacket (type ID `37`), a feature presently proposed in the draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc4880bis. Although the inclusion of this specific subpacket was not within the scope of the current "crypto-refresh" work by the OpenPGP working group, there is optimism that future revisions of the standard will formally integrate this capability, further solidifying the framework for secure and controlled certificate management.
+Furthermore, KOO, Hockeypuck keyserver software, and Sequoia's `sq` command-line tool have plans to support or already support 1pa3pc, demonstrating the community's proactive stance on enhancing certificate security. See how [KOO supports 1pa3pc](https://gitlab.com/keys.openpgp.org/hagrid/-/commit/39c0e12ac64588220d36bada6497d8396f5915b3), [Hockeypuck's statement on "HIP 1: Regaining control over public key identity with authenticated key management"](https://github.com/hockeypuck/hockeypuck/wiki/HIP-1:-Regaining-control-over-public-key-identity-with-authenticated-key-management) and [Sequoia's support](https://man.archlinux.org/man/sq-key-attest-certifications.1)).
 
 (social-graph-metadata-leak)=
 ### Metadata leak of social graph
@@ -311,30 +319,4 @@ Efforts to mitigate this include selective certification sharing, anonymizing as
 
 OpenPGP allows for the addition of unbound, local user IDs to certificates, enhancing personalization and operational flexibility. These IDs, not globally verified, can attach context-specific aliases or metadata. However, this flexibility introduces challenges related to certificate validity, trust, and potential misuse.
 
-The OpenPGP community, including implementations like [Sequoia PGP](https://sequoia-pgp.org/blog/2023/04/08/sequoia-sq/#an-address-book-style-trust-model), advocates for responsible management of local user IDs and their integration. Sequoia certifies these IDs with local trust anchors and marks these binding signatures as "local" artifacts using [Exportable Certification](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-exportable-certification) subpackets to prevent unintended distribution (e.g., to public keyservers), balancing personalization with security and privacy.
-
-## Best practices and recommendations
-
-### Guidelines for certificate minimization
-
-Minimization involves presenting a partial view of a certificate by filtering out some components for specific use cases, such as email encryption where only necessary keys are retained. It serves to enhance performance, address security vulnerabilities like certificate flooding, and protect user privacy. Best practices include:
-
-* omitting unnecessary components and third-party certifications not required for the use case
-* employing strategies like GnuPG's `clean` and `minimize` commands, which compact certificates by removing superseded or irrelevant signatures
-* considering the use case and context when minimizing, ensuring enough historical self-signatures are included for validation
-
-(certificate-freshness)=
-### Handling certificate freshness and expiration
-
-Freshness concerns ensuring certificates are up-to-date, compelling users or their software to poll for updates, such as from a keyserver. Expiration acts as a passive mechanism for certificates to time out, promoting regular updates to reflect the current cryptographic stance of their owners. Best practices include:
-
-* setting appropriate expiration times to force regular updates and limit the use of revoked certificates
-* encouraging automatic updates by OpenPGP software, ideally without human intervention, to maintain certificate relevance and trustworthiness
-
-### Securely distributing and verifying certificates
-
-Distribution mechanisms like WKD, Hagrid, and SKS-style keyservers facilitate the exchange of OpenPGP certificates, each with unique properties affecting security, privacy, and usability. Recommendations for secure distribution and verification include:
-
-* leveraging verifying keyservers like Hagrid for controlled, privacy-aware distribution
-* utilizing WKD for decentralized, domain-controlled certificate hosting
-* adapting to evolving keyserver designs that mitigate vulnerabilities like certificate flooding 
+The OpenPGP community, including implementations like [Sequoia PGP](https://sequoia-pgp.org/blog/2023/04/08/sequoia-sq/#an-address-book-style-trust-model), advocates for responsible management of local user IDs and their integration. Sequoia certifies these IDs with local trust anchors and marks these binding signatures as "local" artifacts using [Exportable Certification](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-exportable-certification) subpackets to prevent unintended distribution (e.g., to public keyservers), balancing personalization with security and privacy.