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(component_signatures_chapter)=
# Signatures on components
This chapter examines OpenPGP signatures associated with certificate components, applying to:
- component keys, encompassing primary keys and subkeys
- identity components, namely User IDs and User attributes
Signatures on components are used to construct and maintain certificates, and to model the authentication of identities.
This chapter expands on topics introduced in the {ref}`certificates_chapter` chapter.
## Self-signatures vs third-party signatures
Component signatures in OpenPGP are categorized into two distinct types:
- **self-signatures**, which are issued by the certificate holder using the certificate's primary key
- **third-party signatures**, which are issued by an external entity, not the certificate holder
### Self-signatures
Self-signatures are fundamental in creating and managing OpenPGP certificates. They bind the various components of a certificate into one combined data structure and facilitate the certificate's life-cycle management.
Life-cycle management operations include:
- binding additional components to a certificate
- modifying expiration dates or other metadata of components
- revoking, and thus invalidating, components or existing self-signatures
Self-signatures are issued by the certificate's owner using the certificate's primary key.
```{note}
No [key flag](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-key-flags) is required to issue self-signatures. An OpenPGP primary key can issue self-signatures by default.
```
### Third-party signatures
Third-party signatures are pivotal in OpenPGP for decentralized authentication, forming the basis of the Web of Trust. They encode authentication-related statements about certificates and linked identities, establishing trustworthiness and verification.
Third-party signatures are used to make specific statements:
- certifying identity claims
- delegating authentication decisions
- revoking, and thus invalidating, prior third-party signature statements
```{note}
The **certify others** [key flag](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-key-flags) (`0x01`) is required to issue third-party signatures. Only the certificate's primary can hold this key flag.
```
### Distinct functions of self-signatures and third-party signatures
The meaning of an OpenPGP signature depends significantly on its issuer. Self-signatures and third-party signatures, even when of the same type, serve distinct functions. For example:
- Certifying self-signatures (type IDs `0x10` - `0x13`) bind a User ID to a certificate.
- Third-party signatures of the same type IDs endorse the authenticity of a User ID.
In another instance:
- *When issued as a self-signature*, a [direct key signature](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-direct-key-signature-type-i) sets preferences and advertises features applicable to the entire certificate.
- *When issued by a third party*, especially when it carries a [trust signature](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-trust-signature) subpacket, a similar direct key signature delegates trust to the signed certificate. This designates the signed certificate as a trust root within the issuer's Web of Trust.
## Self-signatures in certificate formation and management
Self-signatures play a crucial role in forming and managing the structure of OpenPGP certificates. These act as *binding signatures*, joining components and embedding metadata.
Internally, an OpenPGP certificate is essentially a series of packets strung sequentially. When a certificate is stored in a file format known as a [transferable public key](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-10.html#name-transferable-public-keys), packets can be easily added or removed.
To safeguard against unauthorized additions, OpenPGP uses cryptographic signatures. These validate that any additions, such as subkeys or [identity components](identity_components), were made by the owner of the OpenPGP certificate using its primary key. While anyone can still store unrelated elements to a certificate dataset, OpenPGP implementations will reject them if they lack a valid cryptographic connection with the certificate.
```{note}
Conversely, omissions of packets by third parties can easily occur when handling an OpenPGP certificate dataset. This could pose a challenge, for example, when an attacker deliberately omits revocation packets. Without access to an alternative, complete certificate source, recipients might not detect these omissions.
```
However, there are legitimate instances in which third parties add "unbound" packets (i.e., not signed by the certificate's owner) to a certificate:
- [Third-party certifications](third_party_cert) are often stored within the packet data of the certificate to which they are related. This is a standard practice that provides convenience for users by allowing easy access to all relevant certifications. (See {ref}`cert-flooding` for discussion of a related pitfall.)
- OpenPGP software may locally add [unbound identity data](unbound_user_ids) to a certificate.
(bind_subkey)=
### Binding subkeys to a certificate
Subkeys are linked to OpenPGP certificates via a [subkey binding signature](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-10.html#sigtype-subkey-binding) (type ID `0x18`). This signature type indicates the association of the primary key with the subkey.
A subkey binding signature binds a subkey to a primary key, and it embeds metadata into the signature packet. Once generated, the subkey binding signature packet is stored in the certificate directly after the subkey it binds.
Subkeys designated for signing purposes, identified by the *signing* [key flag](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-key-flags), represent a unique category and are handled differently. See {numref}`bind_subkey_sign`.
```{figure} diag/subkey_binding_signature.png
Linking an OpenPGP subkey to the primary key with a binding signature
```
Metadata for the subkey, such as the [*key expiration time*](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#key-expiration-subpacket) and capabilities set by [*key flags*](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#key-flags), are included in subpackets within the subkey binding signature packet.
```{note}
The validity of a subkey is intrinsically linked to that of the primary key. An expired primary key renders any associated subkey invalid, regardless of the subkey's own expiration setting.
Legally, a subkey may not have a specified expiry time. In such cases, its expiration aligns implicitly with that of the primary key. Additionally, the creation date of a subkey must always be more recent than that of the primary key.
```
(bind_subkey_sign)=
### Special case: Binding signing subkeys
Binding subkeys that possess the *signing* key flag to a certificate represents a unique scenario. While similar to the binding process of other subkeys, there is an additional, critical requirement: mutual association.
That is, to bind a signing-capable subkey to a primary key, it is insufficient that the "primary key wants to be associated with the subkey." The subkey must explicitly signal that it "wants to be associated with the primary key."
This mutual binding is crucial for security. Without it, an individual (e.g., Alice) could falsely claim a connection to another person's (e.g., Bob's) signing subkey. To prevent such scenarios, where an attacker might wrongfully "adopt" a victim's signing subkey, a dual-layer of signatures is used:
- the [subkey binding signature](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-10.html#sigtype-subkey-binding) (type ID `0x18`), which is issued by the certificate's primary key
- the [primary key binding signature](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#sigtype-primary-binding) (type ID `0x19`), created by the subkey itself. This is informally known as an embedded "back signature," because the subkey's signature points back to the primary key.
```{figure} diag/subkey_binding_signatur_for_signing_sk.png
Linking an OpenPGP signing subkey to the primary key with a binding signature, and an embedded primary key binding signature
```
The back signature signifies the mutuality of the subkey's association with the primary key and is embedded as subpacket data within the subkey binding signature, reinforcing the authenticity of the binding.
(bind_ident)=
### Binding identities to a certificate
Self-signatures also play a vital role in binding identity components, such as User IDs or User Attributes, to an OpenPGP certificate.
Take for instance, the User ID `Alice Adams <alice@example.org>`. To link this User ID to her OpenPGP certificate (`AAA1 8CBB 2546 85C5 8358 3205 63FD 37B6 7F33 00F9 FB0E C457 378C D29F 1026 98B3`), Alice would use a cryptographic signature.
There are four types of *certifying self-signature*. The most commonly used type for binding User IDs is the [positive certification](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-10.html#sigtype-positive-cert) (type ID `0x13`). Alternatively, types `0x10`, `0x11` or `0x12` might be used. This binding signature must be issued by the primary key.
The certifying self-signature packet – calculated over the primary key, User ID, and metadata of the signature packet – is then added to the certificate, directly following the User ID packet.
```{figure} diag/user_id_certification.png
Linking a User ID to an OpenPGP certificate
```
(primary-metadata)=
### Adding metadata to the primary key/certificate
The signatures that bind subkeys and identity components to a certificate serve dual purposes: linking components to the certificate and adding metadata to components.
Unlike these components, the primary key of a certificate doesn't require a linking signature since it serves as the central anchor of the certificate. However, associating metadata with the primary key is still essential, as it generally applies to the entire certificate.
Metadata can be added to the primary key via two mechanisms:
- direct key signature on the primary key
- *primary User ID* binding signature
The types of metadata typically associated with the primary key through these methods include:
- key expiration
- key flags
- algorithm preference signaling
(direct_key_signature)=
#### Direct key signature
A [*direct key signature*](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-direct-key-signature-type-i) serves as a key mechanism for storing information about the primary key and the entire certificate.
In OpenPGP v6, a direct key signature is the [preferred mechanism](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#section-5.2.3.10-9).
#### Self-signature binding to primary User ID
In an OpenPGP certificate, one User ID serves as the [*primary* User ID](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-primary-user-id). The metadata in the binding self-signature on this User ID applies to the certificate's primary key.
### Revocation self-signatures: Invalidating certificate components
Revocation self-signatures represent an important class of self-signatures, used primarily to invalidate components or retract prior signature statements.
There are several types of revocation signatures, each serving a specific purpose:
- A [**key revocation signature**](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-key-revocation-signature-ty) (type ID `0x20`) marks a primary key as revoked.
- A [**subkey revocation signature**](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-subkey-revocation-signature) (type ID `0x28`) revokes a prior subkey binding signature.
- A [**certification revocation**](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-certification-revocation-si) (type ID `0x30`) revokes a certification signature.
Common scenarios for using revocations include marking certificates or individual subkeys as unusable (e.g., when the private key has been compromised or replaced) or declaring User IDs as no longer valid.
```{note}
OpenPGP certificates act as append-only data structures in practice. Once elements of a certificate are published, they cannot be removed from key servers or third-party OpenPGP systems. Implementations usually merge all available components and signatures.
Revocations are used to mark components or signatures as invalid.
```
Note: certification signatures [can be made irrevocable](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-10.html#name-revocable).
#### Hard vs soft revocations
Revocation signatures often include a [*Reason for Revocation* subpacket](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-reason-for-revocation), with a code specifying why the revocation was issued. This code determines whether the revocation is considered *soft* or *hard*.
- **Soft revocation**: This is typically used for graceful or planned invalidation of components, such as retiring or updating components. It invalidates the component from the revocation signature's creation time, but earlier uses remain valid. Soft revocations can be reversed with a new self-signature.
- **Hard revocation**: This irrevocably invalidates the component, affecting all past and future uses. It is typically used to signal compromise of secret key material.
```{note}
A revocation signature lacking a *Reason for Revocation* subpacket is interpreted as a hard revocation.
```
(third_party_cert)=
## Authentication and delegation in third-party signatures
Third-party signatures in OpenPGP primarily encode authentication statements for identities and delegate trust decisions. These signatures can be manually inspected or processed as machine-readable artifacts by OpenPGP software, which evaluates the authenticity of certificates based on user-specified trust roots.
### Certifying identity components
When a signer issues a certifying signature on an identity, it indicates a verified link between the identity and the certificate. That is, the signer vouches for the connection.
For example, Alice can certify Bob's User ID `Bob Baker <bob@example.com>` with his certificate `0xB0B`, by creating a certification signature that binds Bob's User ID and Bob's certificate. Bob can then distribute Alice's certifying signature as part of his certificate.
Other users may or may not decide to rely on Alice's statement.
### Trust signatures: delegating authentication
OpenPGP uses [*trust signature*](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#trust-signature-subpacket) subpackets to delegate authentication decisions, transforming the recipient certificate into a "trusted introducer" (or a trust root) for the user. This includes specifying trust depth (or level) for transitive delegations and quantifying trust with numerical values, indicating the extent of reliance on the introducer's certifications.
Trust signature subpackets are applicable in:
- identity certification signatures (type ID `0x10` - `0x13`)
- [direct key signatures](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-direct-key-signature-type-i) (type ID `0x1F`)
#### Trust depth/level
The trust depth (or level) in OpenPGP signifies the extent of transitive delegation within the authentication process. It determines how far the trust can be extended from the original trusted introducer to subsequent intermediaries. Essentially, a certificate with a designated trust depth acts as a "meta-introducer," facilitating authentication decisions across multiple levels in the network.
For example, a trust depth of 1 means there is direct trust in the certifications made by the trusted introducer. In this case, the user's OpenPGP software will accept certifications made directly by the introducer for authenticating identities.
However, when the trust depth is set higher, it implies a chain of trust extending beyond the initial introducer. The user's software will recognize and accept certifications made not only by the primary introducer but also by other intermediaries whom the primary introducer trusts.
This allows for a more extensive network of trusted certifications, enabling a broader and more interconnected Web of Trust.
```{admonition} VISUAL
:class: warning
Heiko, I found the example confusing. So more text is here AND I recommend adding a visual to illustrate it, using your former example.
```
#### Trust amounts
The trust amount, with a numerical value ranging from 0 to 255, quantifies the degree of trust in a delegation.
A higher value indicates greater trust, such as 120 for complete trust, while lower values suggest partial trust. This quantification aids OpenPGP software in determining the authentication level based on combined trust from multiple trusted introducers.
```{admonition} VISUAL
:class: warning
add diagrams? @heiko -- yes, using the examples that I removed
```
#### Limiting delegation scope
When using *trust signature* subpackets, a delegation can be limited to identities that match a [*regular expression*](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#regex-subpacket).
With this mechanism, for example, it is possible to delegate authentication decisions only for User IDs that match the email domain of an organization.
```{admonition} VISUAL
:class: warning
add diagrams?
```
(wot)=
### Web of Trust: Decentralized trust decisions
The Web of Trust in OpenPGP is a trust model that facilitates authentication decisions through a network of certifications and delegations.[^strong-set] It is characterized by a so-called [strong set](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_of_trust#Strong_set), which refers to a group of certificates that are robustly interconnected via third-party certifications.
In this model, users independently delegate authentication decisions, choosing whom to trust among various certificate issuers. This delegation is based on the certificates and third-party signatures available to them, with their OpenPGP software applying the Web of Trust mechanism to discern the reliability of each certificate for an identity.
The OpenPGP RFC doesn't specify exactly how Web of Trust calculations are performed. It only defines the data formats on which these calculations can be performed. See external resources in {numref}`wot-resources`.
### Revoking third-party signatures
To reverse a previously issued third-party signature, the issuer can generate a [*certification revocation signature*](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-certification-revocation-si) (type ID `0x30`). The revocation must be issued by the same key that created the original signature or, in deprecated practice, by a designated Revocation Key.
## Advanced topics
### Certification recipes
Different signatures in OpenPGP serve various specific purposes. This section provides practical guidance on creating these signatures, illustrating each with concrete examples.
#### Change algorithm preferences
To modify the preferred symmetric, compression, hash, or AEAD algorithms for a key, the key owner needs to issue a direct-key signature (type `0x1F`) on the primary key.
This signature should have the following structure:
| Subpacket | Area | Critical | Mandatory | Notes |
|---------------------------------|--------|----------------|-------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| Signature Creation Time | Hashed | True | True | Current time |
| Issuer Fingerprint | Hashed | True or False | Strongly Recommended | The primary key is the issuer |
| Key Flags | Hashed | True | False | Retain key flags from the previous self-signature |
| Features | Hashed | True | False | Retain features from the previous self-signature |
| Key Expiration Time | Hashed | True | False | Retain expiration time from the previous self-signature, if applicable |
| Hash Algorithm Preferences | Hashed | False | False | New preferences |
| Compression Algorithm Preferences | Hashed | False | False | New preferences |
| Symmetric Algorithm Preferences | Hashed | False | False | New preferences |
| AEAD Algorithm Preferences | Hashed | False | False | New preferences |
#### Change expiration time
To adjust the expiration time of an OpenPGP certificate, issue a new *DirectKey* signature (type `0x1F`) with a modified Key Expiration Time subpacket. The structure of this signature is identical to the one outlined in the previous section on changing algorithm preferences.
Additionally, the expiration date can be altered for individual User IDs (detailed below) or separate subkeys (see {numref}`bind_subkey`).
#### Add User ID
To bind a User ID to an OpenPGP certificate, the signature should have the following structure:
| Subpacket | Area | Critical | Mandatory | Notes |
|-------------------------|--------|----------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Signature Creation Time | Hashed | True | True | Current time |
| Issuer Fingerprint | Hashed | True or False | Strongly Recommended | The primary key is the issuer |
| Primary User ID | Hashed | True | False | Optional |
| Signature Expiration Time | Hashed | True | False | Optional |
In addition to these subpackets, self-certifications for User IDs can include others – such as key flags, features, and algorithm preferences – as shown in the previous table. This enables the specification of unique capabilities and preferences for each identity associated with the certificate.
#### Remove or revoke a User ID
Since OpenPGP certificates are often distributed by the means of key servers, new signatures on a certificate are often "merged" into existing copies of the certificate locally by the recipient. This integration process means it is practically impossible to directly remove signatures or User IDs from a certificate, as there is no way to communicate the intention of packet deletion to the recipient.
To effectively mark a User ID as invalid, the user can publish a copy of their certificate with a *CertificationRevocation* signature (type `0x30`) attached to the invalidated User ID. This signature signals that the specified User ID is no longer valid or associated with the certificate holder.
The structure of a *CertificationRevocation* is as follows:
| Subpacket | Area | Critical | Mandatory | Notes |
|-------------------------|--------|----------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Signature Creation Time | Hashed | True | True | Current time |
| Issuer Fingerprint | Hashed | True or False | Strongly Recommended | The primary key is the issuer |
| Reason for Revocation | Hashed | True | False | Determines soft or hard revocation |
For User ID revocations, the *Reason for Revocation* subpacket is crucial. A value of `0` means no specific reason, leading to a hard revocation, while `32` indicates the User ID is no longer valid, resulting in a soft revocation. Omitting the reason subpacket is also equivalent to a hard revocation.
It is generally advisable to use reason code `32` for revoking User IDs.
(binding_subkeys)=
#### Add a subkey
Users may need to add a new subkey to their OpenPGP certificate, often for reasons such as upgrading to a subkey with more advanced cryptographic algorithms. The process involves creating a specific signature structure:
| Subpacket | Area | Critical | Mandatory | Notes |
|-------------------------------|--------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| Signature Creation Time | Hashed | True | True | Current time |
| Issuer Fingerprint | Hashed | True or False | Strongly Recommended | The primary key is the issuer |
| Key Flags | Hashed | True | Strongly Recommended | Determine the usage of the key |
| Key Expiration Time | Hashed | True | False | Specifies the expiration date of the subkey |
| Embedded Signature | Hashed | True | If Key Flags contains **S** | Signing subkeys require embedded *Primary Key Binding* signature |
| Hash Algorithm Preferences | Hashed | False | False | Per key preferences |
| Compression Algorithm Preferences | Hashed | False | False | Per key preferences |
| Symmetric Algorithm Preferences | Hashed | False | False | Per key preferences |
| AEAD Algorithm Preferences | Hashed | False | False | Per key preferences |
In addition to these subpackets, users can specify algorithm preferences for each subkey, distinct from those set in the certificate's *DirectKey* signature.
#### Revoke a subkey
Subkeys, like User IDs, can be individually revoked in OpenPGP.
This is done by issuing a `SubkeyRevocation` signature (type `0x28`) using the primary key.
The structure of such a signature is straightforward:
| Subpacket | Area | Critical | Mandatory | Notes |
|-------------------------|--------|----------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Signature Creation Time | Hashed | True | True | Current time |
| Issuer Fingerprint | Hashed | True or False | Strongly Recommended | The primary key is the issuer |
| Reason for Revocation | Hashed | True | False | Determines soft or hard revocation |
In `SubkeyRevocation` signatures, the [reason for revocation](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-reason-for-revocation) subpacket is critical. The values `1` (key superseded) and `3` (key retired and no longer used) indicate soft revocations, whereas values `0` (no reason) and `2` (key compromised) indicate hard revocations.
Note that a value of `32` is not applicable in these signatures.
#### Revoke a certificate
Users may find themselves needing to revoke their entire OpenPGP certificate, rendering it unusable. This could be for various reasons, such as migrating to a new certificate or in response to a compromise of the certificate's secret key material.
While a soft-revoked certificate can be re-validated at a later time with a new certification, a hard revocation is typically permanent.
The recommended way to revoke a certificate is by issuing a *KeyRevocation* signature (type `0x20`). Its structure is similar to that of a *CertificationRevocation* signature.
| Subpacket | Area | Critical | Mandatory | Notes |
|-------------------------|--------|----------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Signature Creation Time | Hashed | True | True | Current time |
| Issuer Fingerprint | Hashed | True or False | Strongly Recommended | The primary key is the issuer |
| Reason for Revocation | Hashed | True | False | Determines soft or hard revocation |
For *KeyRevocation* signatures, the guidelines regarding the [*Reason for Revocation* subpacket] (https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-reason-for-revocation) are the same as those for *SubkeyRevocation* signatures.
#### Common subpackets in OpenPGP signatures
In OpenPGP, certain subpackets are universally expected across all types of signatures, serving fundamental roles in the signature's structure and verification:
* **Signature Creation Time**: This is a mandatory subpacket in every OpenPGP signature. It contains the timestamp of when the signature was created. For security and integrity, this subpacket must be located in the hashed area of the signature and is recommended to be marked as critical.
* **Issuer Fingerprint**: Essential for signature verification, this subpacket identifies the key (or subkey) used to create the signature. OpenPGP v6 signatures should include the Issuer Fingerprint subpacket, containing the 32-byte fingerprint of the key.
```{note}
The key used as the issuer in the signature might be a subkey of the primary key.
```
This subpacket can be placed in either the hashed or unhashed area due to its self-authenticating nature. However, it is recommended to include it in the signature's hashed area for enhanced security.
### Managing subpacket conflicts and duplication
In OpenPGP signatures, both the hashed and unhashed areas are composed of lists of subpackets. Inherently, this structure permits the duplication of the same subpacket, which could lead to conflicts. To manage these potential conflicts:
- **Precedence of hashed area**: Subpackets within the hashed area of a signature take precedence over those in the unhashed area. This hierarchy helps resolve conflicts when the same subpacket appears in both areas.
- **Handling conflicts within the same area**: Conflicts can still arise within the same area, such as when two subpackets have different expiration dates. In such cases, the [OpenPGP specification](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12.html#name-notes-on-subpackets) advises that implementations should favor the last occurrence of a conflicting subpacket in the hashed area.
In certain scenarios, having duplicate subpackets with conflicting content is logical and even necessary. For example, consider a signature created by a version 4 issuer key, which was upgraded from an older OpenPGP version (like v3). Since the key ID calculation scheme changed from v3 to v4, the identifiers for the same key would differ between these versions. Therefore, a v4 signature might contain two issuer key ID subpackets, each with different, yet correct values for v3 and v4 keys, respectively. This allows for backward compatibility and ensures the signature can be validated under both key ID calculation schemes.