openpgp-notes/book/source/06-signatures.md

OpenPGP Signatures

Signatures are a fundamental mechanism within OpenPGP. They provide the syntax for forming and interpreting comprehensive statements about certificates and their components, as well as for ensuring the integrity and authenticity of data.

Without signatures, keys would remain unassociated with any certificate or owner. Signatures are crucial for binding component keys and identity components into hierarchical certificates and for establishing the authenticity of messages.

Terminology

Within OpenPGP, the term signature can have two different meanings:

• Cryptographic signature: a sequence of bytes created by cryptographic keys, calculated according to a signature scheme.
• OpenPGP signature packets: Defined in the OpenPGP standard, these packets combine a raw cryptographic signature along with a type designation and additional metadata.

Two meanings of the term "signature" in OpenPGP

In this document, "signature" will refer to OpenPGP signature packets.

(signature_types)=

Signature types in OpenPGP

The OpenPGP standard defines a set of Signature types, each identified by a numerical signature type ID. Signature types define the purpose of a signature and how it should be interpreted.

Signature types can be predominantly classified in two ways:

• Signatures over data: These signatures are denoted by type IDs 0x00 for binary documents and 0x01 for canonical text documents. The signer uses these signatures to claim ownership, assert creation, or certify the immutability of the document.
• Signatures on components: These are signatures that are associated with component keys or identity components of a certificate.

Signatures on components are a complex topic, and we discuss them in depth in {ref}component_signatures_chapter. They are grouped based on two criteria:

• the origin of the signature, distinguishing between a self-signature and a third-party signature
• the nature of the statement made by the signature, such as certifying an identity or binding component keys into a certificate

An overview of signature types in OpenPGP

This chapter will cover the overarching principles applicable to all OpenPGP signature types.

For more detail about specific types of signatures, see the chapters on {ref}signing_data and {ref}component_signatures_chapter, respectively.

Structure of an OpenPGP signature packet

As outlined above, an OpenPGP signature is a composite data structure, which combines:

• Signature type ID: specifies the signature's intended meaning, as detailed above
• Metadata: varies based, in part, on the signature type ID; mostly encoded as "subpackets" (see {ref}signature_subpackets)
• Raw cryptographic signature

Structure of an OpenPGP signature packet

Creating an OpenPGP signature packet

Creating an OpenPGP signature packet involves encoding a statement about a specific set of data within the packet.

The input data of a signature packet includes:

• Packets being signed: Typically one or more packets, though sometimes none, depending on the context. These are the packets to which the signature statement pertains.
• Data within the signature packet: This includes information that specifies the intent of the signature.

The input data is determined by the signature type and consists of the exact content that the signature statement addresses.

The signature packet consists of two parts:

1. Statement definition: This part of the packet defines the meaning or intent of the signature.
2. Cryptographic digital signature: This is the formal endorsement by the signer, created as follows:
   • A hash digest is calculated from the input data.
   • The signature is then calculated for this hash digest.

Creating a signature in OpenPGP

Verifying an OpenPGP signature packet

Verifying an OpenPGP signature packet is similar to its creation, with some crucial differences that facilitate the verification by entities other than the signer.

The main differences:

• Access to public key: Unlike the creation process, which is exclusive to the signer, verification can be performed by anyone who has access to the public key of the signer.
• Use of signature verification mechanism: After calculating the hash digest from the input data, a signature verification mechanism is employed. This mechanism uses the hash digest, the cryptographic signature from the signature packet, and the public key of the signer. Its purpose is to ascertain the cryptographic validity of the signature.

Verifying a signature in OpenPGP

(signature_subpackets)=

Signature subpackets

In the OpenPGP protocol, signature subpackets enhance the expressiveness of a signature beyond what is conveyed by just the bare cryptographic signature and the signature type ID. These subpackets, introduced in RFC 2440, are essential for embedding additional metadata within signature packets.

Signature subpackets serve as sub-elements within signature packets, providing extra context and meaning to a signature. They are formatted as key-value pairs, where the keys are defined as subpacket type IDs by the RFC. The RFC also provides the format and interpretation of the values.

Examples of signature subpackets

• The issuer fingerprint subpacket encodes the fingerprint of the component key that issued the signature.
• The key flags subpacket defines the capabilities are assigned to a component key within a certificate.

Hashed and unhashed signature subpackets

Signature subpackets within OpenPGP can reside in one of two distinct areas of a signature packet, each serving a different purpose and providing varying levels of security.

• Hashed area: Hashed subpackets are included in the hash digest of the signature and are thus covered by its cryptographic signature. They reliably express the signer's intent.
• Unhashed area: Unhashed subpackets, conversely, are not included in the hash digest for the signature. They are thus not protected against tampering and can be used to retroactively add, change, or remove metadata in a signature packet without affecting its validity. They are primarily used for advisory purposes or in scenarios where the integrity of the subpacket content can be self-authenticated. An example is the issuer fingerprint subpacket, which can be validated through successful signature verification using the referenced issuer key.

The majority of signature subpackets are stored in the hashed area.

For detailed information and specifications, refer to Hashed vs. Unhashed Subpackets in the OpenPGP RFC.

Criticality of subpackets

Each signature subpacket has a flag that indicates whether the subpacket is critical. When set, the criticality flag signals that a receiving implementation that does not know a subpacket type, must consider this an error, and may not consider the signature valid.

The reason for this mechanism is that OpenPGP implementations may only support subsets of the standard - and the standard may be extended over time, including by the addition of new subpacket types.

However, it would be fatal if, for example, an implementation did not understand the concept of signature expiration. Such an implementation would potentially accept an already expired signature. By marking the expiration date subpacket as critical, the creating implementation can indicate that recipients who do not understand this of subpacket must consider the signature as invalid.

RFC Sections 5.2.3.11 - 5.2.3.36 give guidance on which subpackets should be marked as critical.

Advanced topics

Notation signature subpackets

Notations are a signature subpacket type that can be used to effectively extend the otherwise limited set of signature subpacket types with user-defined notations. An issuer can use notations to add name-value data to an OpenPGP signature.

Notation names are UTF-8 encoded strings. They may reside in the "user namespace," which means a notation tag (in UTF-8 string format) followed by a DNS domain name.

Use of notations by Keyoxide

Notations have, for example, been used for the popular decentralized identity verification service Keyoxide. Keyoxide uses notations in the ariadne.id namespace. See the Keyoxide documentation for more details.

"Negotiating" signature hash algorithm based on recipients preference subpackets

:class: warning

investigate, discuss: GnuPG uses preference packets for the User ID that was addressed while sequoia completely omits User ID preferences and either uses Direct Key Sigs or (I think) primary User ID.

Explore viability of having multiple signatures, e.g. v4+v6?

:class: warning

C-R 5.2. says: An implementation MUST generate a version 6 signature when signing with a version 6 key. An implementation MUST generate a version 4 signature when signing with a version 4 key.