further clarify

This commit is contained in:
Heiko Schaefer 2023-11-28 19:53:44 +01:00
parent 8719b9deb2
commit 46f3ee92f5
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: DAE9A9050FCCF1EB

View file

@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ Self-signatures play a crucial role in forming and managing the structure of Ope
Internally, an OpenPGP certificate is essentially a series of packets strung sequentially. When a certificate is stored in a file format known as a [transferable public key](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-10.html#name-transferable-public-keys), packets can be easily added or removed.
To safeguard against unauthorized additions and alterations of components, OpenPGP uses cryptographic signatures. These validate that any additions, such as added subkeys or [identity components](identity_components), were made by the owner of the OpenPGP certificate using its primary key. While anyone can still store unrelated elements to a certificate dataset, OpenPGP implementations will reject them if they lack a valid cryptographic connection with the certificate.
To safeguard against unauthorized addition or alteration of components, OpenPGP uses cryptographic signatures. These validate that all components, such as subkeys or [identity components](identity_components), were linked to the OpenPGP certificate by its owner, using the primary key. While anyone can still store unrelated elements to a certificate dataset, OpenPGP implementations will reject them if they lack a valid cryptographic connection with the certificate.
```{note}
Conversely, omissions of packets by third parties can easily occur when handling an OpenPGP certificate dataset. This could pose a challenge, for example, when an attacker deliberately omits revocation packets. Without access to an alternative, complete certificate source, recipients might not detect these omissions.